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The New Russian Roulette:
Brady Revisited
Jannice E. Joseph*
I. Introduction
Delma Banks served over twenty-three years on Texas's death row after
being convicted of killing a white teenager in 1981.1 Banks's reprieve from death
came when, just hours before his scheduled execution, the United States
Supreme Court granted a stay.2 The Court subsequently granted certiorari and
ruled that the prosecution violated Brady v. Mayland,' by failing to disclose to the
defense that one of two key witnesses was a paid informant.' Additionally, the
Court held that the lower court erred in denying a certificate of appealability on
whether Banks had adequately raised a second Brady claim that another witness
was extensively coached prior to his testimony.5 At trial, the defense relied upon
the State's promise that no formal Brady request was necessary because the
prosecution would turn over all evidence to which the defendant was entitled.6
The State did not turn over this evidence until nineteen years after the trial
concluded and Banks had been sentenced to death.7 In reaching its decision, the
Court implicitly expanded the reach of Brady and reinforced the Kyles v. Wbitley
line of cases that impute to the prosecution knowledge of exculpatory or
impeaching evidence in the possession of the police or other branches of law
enforcement.'
*
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1.
Banks v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 1256, 1267 (2004).
2.

Banks v. Cockrell, 538 U.S. 917, 917 (2003).

3.

6.

373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1279; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1263.
at 1263-64.
Id.

7.
8.

Id at 1268-69.
514 U.S. 419 (1995).

9.

See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (finding that the prosecution has a duty

4.
5.

to learn of exculpatory evidence known to others acting on behalf of the government); Banks, 124

33
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Prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory material in the criminal justice
system undermines the fair administration of justice and the reliability of the
results produced by criminal trials.'0 The prosecution and defense must honestly
and reliably fulfill their duties for the criminal justice system to function in a
trustworthy manner." The prosecution's nondisclosure of material exculpatory
evidence during and after trial challenges the precept that only the guilty will be
prosecuted, convicted, and punished. 12 The prosecution represents the public,
and the public wins not only when the guilty are convicted but also when
criminal trials are fair.' 3 When the prosecution maintains a win-at-all-costs
mentality and either suppresses exculpatory evidence or tailors witness
statements to suit its needs, it violates the public trust. 4
This article will discuss the current status of Brady in capital cases and ways
that defense counsel can ensure that their clients reap the full benefit of Brady at
all phases of trial. Part II of this article surveys problematic aspects of the Brady
doctrine. Part III focuses on the witness preparation aspect of Banks and
discusses Banks's implication that material generated in the course of victim and
witness interviews may be treated as Brady material. Part IV focuses on witness
proffers and argues for a standard that would require all proffers to be memorialized for Brady purposes. Part V examines the emerging issue of whether
victim-witness advocates' files should be subject to potential Brady disclosure.
Part VI discusses ways defense counsel might take advantage of the current
modest expansion of the Brady doctrine as evidenced by cases such as Banks.
S. Ct. at 1278-79 (stating that witness Farr's relationship as an informant should have been
disclosed as impeachment evidence); United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500,1501 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(remanding for failure by the prosecutor to search the files of other agencies for exculpatory
evidence).
10.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct mandate that:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall... (d) make timely disclosure to the defense of
all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to
the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the
prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective
order of the tribunal.
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2003).
11.
SeeElliott v. Commonwealth, 1 S.E.2d 273,275 (Va. 1939) (quoting Wilson v. Commonwealth, 162 S.E. 15, 17 (Va. 1932)) (" 'An accused should not, by wilful act, be placed in such an
attitude before the jury by the representative of the commonwealth whose duty to prosecute one
accused of crime is coexistent with his duty to see that the accused is accorded a fair and impartial
trial.' ").
12.
See general!y Scott E. Sundby, FallenSuperberoes and ConstitutionalMirages: The Tale ofBrady
v. Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L. REv. 643, 644 (2002) (discussing the Brady doctrine in criminal
cases).
13.
See id. at 644 (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87) (noting that Brady was thought to represent
not only that a defendant must have access to exculpatory material, but the prosecution would also
pursue justice and not simply victory in the court).
14.
See Brady, 373 U.S. at 83-84 (noting society's interest in fair criminal trials).
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II. Defendant's Right to Excu oatogy Material

Brady established a defendant's right to exculpatory material. 5 The Court
held that the prosecution must turn over any exculpatory information or
evidence to the defense that is material to guilt or punishment. 6 While the
United States Supreme Court's central holding in Brady was favorable to
defendants, subsequent cases demonstrated that the contours of Brady were not
clear. 7 This is because the prosecution's failure to turn over exculpatory material
United States v. Bagley,'9 followed by
may not constitute a Brady violation.'
2°
Strickler v. Greene, established that to prove a Brady violation, the defense must
show both that the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either because
it is exculpatory or because it weakens some aspect of the prosecution's case, and
that the defendant has sustained a relatively high level of prejudice as a result of
the suppression. 2'
Cases since Brady have expanded the doctrine in some areas but constricted
it in others.Y These decisions expanded Brady to include exculpatory material
without a specific request by the defense 23 and evidence in the control of actors
other than the prosecutor but under government control.2 4 Brady has also been
expanded to include defense proffers to the prosecution..2 ' In addition, Brady
now applies to the suppression of transcripts of prosecution rehearsal meetings

15.
Id at 87.
16.
See id (finding that a State denies a defendant due process when it fails to disclose to the
defendant before trial evidence favorable to the defendant that is material either to guilt or to
punishment).
17.
See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81, 84 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that although
the Government has a duty to make a good faith effort to discover and disclose Brady material, a
failure to fulfill this duty will be harmless error unless the defendant is able to show the information
sought was material).
18.
See, e.g., Morrow v. Dretke, 367 F.3d 309, 322 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that failure to
disclose various FBI reports which would have a cumulative effect did not violate Brady).
19.
473 U.S. 667 (1985).
20.
527 U.S. 263 (1999).
21.
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,678-83 (1985) (clarifying the standard of review
when exculpatory material is suppressed); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,281 (1999) (stating that
no Brady violation exists unless there is reasonable probability the verdict would have been different).
22.
Sundby, supra note 12, at 645.
23.
See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,107 (1976) (stating that the prosecution has a duty
to disclose exculpatory evidence even in cases when no request has been made by defense).
24.
See Kyes, 514 U.S. at 437 (stating that the knowledge of government agents is imputed
to the prosecution).
25.
See Spicer v. Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d 547, 555-57 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that
defense proffers of a cooperation witness's proposed testimony are subject to Brady).
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has also
with witnesses.26 On the other hand, the United States
27 Supreme Court
constricted the meaning of materiality under Brady.
A problematic aspect of Brady is that it is mainly enforced post-trial.2"
Defense attorneys are usually unable to discover exculpatory material unless the
prosecution follows its ethical duties and legal discovery obligations.29 When the
prosecution suppresses material exculpatory evidence, the defense must proceed
to trial without such evidence. This puts the prosecution at an unfair advantage
during trial. Every trial is a story-telling enterprise in which the prosecution and
defense each attempt to convince the audience that its particular version of the
story is correct.3" Exculpatory evidence is part of the story-telling lawyers engage
in, and how each particular story ends depends upon the extent of the details
available to each party.3 ' When facts critical to the narrative are omitted, the
triers of fact must insert opinions and suppositions into those missing
moments.32
The Bagly Court placed a heavy post-trial burden upon the defense by
requiring the defense, on appeal, to demonstrate that it has suffered such
prejudice from the prosecution's withholding of exculpatory evidence and that
the withheld evidence is reasonably likely to have changed the trial's outcome.33
Given the difficulty of such a retrospective approach, some reform proponents
focus on the pretrial rather than the appellate stage of the proceeding. For
example, the Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment recently recommended
to the Supreme Court of Illinois that it consider requiring a final case
management conference in capital cases to insure compliance with the discovery
rules and that each case is fully prepared for trial.' The Commission noted that
26.
See Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1280 n.19 (discussing the rehearsal transcripts suppressed by the
prosecution).
27.
See Strckler, 527 U.S. at 281-82 (noting that the only true Brady violations are suppressions of evidence reasonably likely to alter the outcome of a trial); Bagly, 473 U.S. at 682 (finding
undisclosed evidence "material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different").
Sundby, supra note 12, at 645.
28.
Id at 651.
29.
See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172,189 (1997) (noting that "[a] convincing tale
30.
may be told with economy, but when economy becomes a break in the natural sequence of narrative
evidence, an assurance that the missing link is really there is never more than second best").
31.
Id
32.
Id
See Bagly, 473 U.S. at 683 (noting that the reviewing court should examine the totality of
33.
the circumstances as to how the outcome of the trial would have changed in light of the
nondisclosure); Strckler, 527 U.S. at 294 (noting that although the prosecution failed to disclose
exculpatory materials in police files that cast doubt on portions of an eyewitness testimony, there
was no prejudice because of evidence in the record pointing to the defendant's guilt).
See THE GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVER34.
at
(April 2002)
117
PUNISHMENT
CAPITAL
ON
NOR'S
COMM'N
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"[t]he trial judge is the person responsible for managing the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defense before the jury, and supervising the overall conduct
of the trial to insure that a fair and just result is obtained."'3 By conducting case
management conferences, both the defense and prosecution will be more
adequately prepared, and the flow of information will result in a more efficient
process.36 During the conferences, examination of what is considered
exculpatory evidence by both the defense and the prosecution will benefit from
the impartial scrutiny of the judge. 37 The conferences will facilitate the efficient
flow of information between the parties and ensure that all discovery requests
have been complied with. 3' For example, when the prosecution has complied
with a Brady motion but the defense is aware of additional information in the
prosecution's possession material to its case, the case management conference
provides the defense an opportunity to alert the judge to why the information
is material and should be disclosed. The defense, of course, will bear the burden
of proving that the evidence sought is exculpatory and material.39 However, the
case management conference gives the defense the opportunity to inform the
judge about the evidence without revealing its entire case strategy. 4'
Such conferences will potentially place more information in the record for
examination at the appellate level.' The appellate court will conduct a more
efficient review of the record when the discovery that was sifted through a case
management conference is readily available.42 Additionally, the materiality of
withheld evidence should be more readily apparent to the appellate court in cases
where the defense has had the opportunity to apprise the trial judge of its
reasons for seeking disclosure.43 This in turn means that the post-trial burden
of the defendant to demonstrate prejudice from suppression of exculpatory
evidence will become less onerous.' A uniform adoption of the rule proposed
by the Illinois Commission might, therefore, result in more adherence to Brady.
While a prosecutor has an ethical duty to disclose any and all exculpatory
evidence before and during trial as it is received or revealed, this duty is often
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission report/complete-report.pdf [hereinafter
ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT]

(addressing matters that arise before the guilt

and innocence phase begins).
35. Id.
36.

Id

37.

Id

38.

Id

39.
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (requiring the defendant to show that the evidence was material to
either guilt or punishment).
40.
ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 34, at 117.
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
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ignored until discovered at the appellate level.4" Additionally, even when a
defense attorney requests that the trial judge examine the evidence in camera for
exculpatory purposes, the judge may frequently defer to the prosecution's
assertion that it has no exculpatory material.' Suppression of evidence, false
testimony, and undisclosed witness coaching during trial threaten the justice
47
The adversarial
system and lead to untrustworthy and unreliable outcomes.
system must be transparent, which means the prosecution should disclose to the
defense all information not otherwise exempt.4" The adversarial system must at
times yield to transparency in the proceedings to ensure that justice is fair and
impartial.49 "A fair trial under fair procedure is a basic element in our
Government. Zealous partisans filled with bias and prejudice have no place
among those whom government selects to play important parts in trials designed
to lead to fair determinations of guilt or innocence. '
Numerous cases of Brady violations nationwide suggest that Bagly has set
too high a standard for the determination of materiality."' According to Bag1ly,
See Hudson v. Whitley, 979 F.2d 1058,1061 (5th Cir. 1992) (describing how the prosecu45.
tion had suppressed evidence that the only eyewitness had previously identified someone other than
the defendant and that the other person had been arrested); Walter v. Lockhart, 763 F.2d 942, 948
(8th Cir. 1985) (finding that the prosecution withheld a transcript for over twenty years that
supported defendant's claim that the officer shot him first); Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1347
(10th Cir. 1984) (finding that the prosecution withheld evidence which contradicted the prosecution's theory of murder and placed the defendant 110 miles from the scene of crime); see also Ken
Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdct: Dishonor Series: Trial & Eror. How ProsecutorsSacrifice
Justiceto Win, CHI. TRIB.,Jan. 10, 1999, available at 1999 WL 2833492 (discussing the impact of Brad
violations nationwide).
See Sundby, supra note 12, at 660 (citing Strickler,527 U.S. at 291) (noting that in Strickler
46.
the district court, while recognizing a Bradyviolation based on "potentially devastating impeachment
material," denied relief because the evidence did not establish "reasonable probability in a different
result'.
See Lux v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 145, 149 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Common47.
wealth v. Kilgore, 426 S.E.2d 837,842 (Va. Ct. App. 1993)) ("A Commonwealth's attorney's duties
include the impartial prosecution of those accused of crime and the duty to see that an accused is
accorded a fair trial."); see also Kilgore, 426 S.E.2d at 842 (quoting Compton v. Commonwealth, 55
S.E.2d 446, 450 (Va. 1949)) (" 'Both [the] court and counsel should not forget that the object
sought is a fair trial... in keeping with our high traditions of justice. All that endangers that result
should be avoided.' "(alteration in original)); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 23 S.E.2d 139, 142 (Va.
1942) ("The attorney for the Commonwealth is not only under the duty to prosecute one accused
of crime, but it is also his duty to see that an accused is accorded a fair trial.").
See Matter of Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478,488 (D.N.M. 1992) ("mThe successful functioning
48.
of the adversary system depends upon the coordination of the roles of the prosecutor, the defender
and the trier. Without the proper balancing of these roles, the structure fails.").
See Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 569-70 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating
49.
reasons why the defendant was denied equal protection).
50.
Id
See, e.g., Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, The Flip Side OfA FairTrial Series: Trial &
51.
Error.How ProsecutorsSacrificeJustice To Win, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1999, available at 1999 WL 2873462
(noting a Chicago Tribune nationwide study revealed 381 cases reversed for two main types of
misconduct use of false evidence and concealing evidence suggesting innocence).
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"[Elvidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different."52 Therefore, a prosecutor can suppress evidence which is
undeniably favorable to the defense so long as the evidence does not grievously
weaken the State's case. Moreover, because prosecutors presumably do not
prosecute those they consider innocent, the Bagly standard means that logically
Brady should almost never apply. If the prosecution truly viewed the suppressed
evidence as material-that is, as reasonably likely to create a reasonable
doubt-then presumably he or she would not bring the case to trial in the first
place.
However, blatant Brad violations by the prosecution often come to light
at the appellate level.5 3 A less demanding standard of materiality is required in
order to truly resolve the tension the prosecution faces between being an
advocate and an adversary.
[A] government prosecutor [stands] in a unique position in the
criminal justice system. He [is] an advocate in an adversary system,
but unlike the private advocate . . . [a] prosecutor [is] required to
insure that the outcome [is] a just one. While the [private advocate]
may want to keep information materially supporting his adversary's
case from his opponent, the.., prosecutor cannot.
A less stringent standard of materiality will ensure that the prosecution cannot
determine the outcome of a trial by withholding favorable evidence from the
defense by virtue of its position.55 While still being required to act as an advocate
and gather evidence for his case, the prosecutor will not be faced with the
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
52.
53.
See In re Sealed Case No. 99-3096, 185 F.3d 887, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (remanding and
instructing the district court to order the U.S. Attorney's office to review records in possession of
its prosecution team for evidence indicating an informant who provided information leading to
defendant's arrest had a deal with the prosecution); Guerra v.Johnson, 90 F.3d 1075,1077-78,1080
(5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the prosecution suppressed evidence showing that the police and the
prosecution intimidated witnesses and failed to disclose evidence regarding who was observed
carrying the murder weapon shortly after crime); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 (9th
Cir. 1995) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on defendant's claim that the Government failed to
disclose Brady material in light of inconsistencies between officer's trial testimony and his police
report); United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that even though
the jury evaluated credibility through other impeaching evidence, Brady required disclosure of the
criminal record of a key prosecution witness); Cornell v. Nix, 921 F.2d 769,770-71 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding that an evidentiary hearing was required on habeas claim when the State did not disclose
that a prosecution witness recanted testimony regarding defendant's confession); Bowman v.
Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 110,112-13 (Va. 1994) (noting that the prosecution's failure to disclose
an exculpatory report violated the defendant's due process rights); Burrows v. Commonwealth, 438
S.E.2d 300, 303 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that the prosecution must provide the criminal record
of one of its witnesses and failure to do so violated the defendant's due process rights).
54.
United States v. Snell, 899 F. Supp. 17, 19 (D. Mass. 1995).
55.
Id at 20.
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tension between disclosing favorable evidence that would weaken his 5case,
or
6
withholding such evidence and strengthening the odds of a conviction.
A less demanding materiality standard arguably will require a diversion of
prosecution resources if prosecutors are forced to devote more attention and
effort to scrutinizing prosecution files on behalf of the defendant." Additionally,
there is no guarantee that such changes will result in a substantial increase in
error-correction involving Brady violations. The prosecution, however, would
have no greater burden in examining its files under a more lenient materiality
standard. Essentially, the prosecution would be disclosing information it
previously considered as "merely favorable" but not "material" to the defendant.
Disclosing all evidence favorable to the defendant will resolve the contradiction
between the prosecution's viewing the evidence through the lens of materiality
and the defense search for "merely favorable" material. The disclosure of all
evidence favorable to the defense will curb good faith Brady violations and most
importantly, on a case by case basis, will provide appellate courts with a clearer
view of wilful Brady violations where sanctions should be imposed.
Pretrial examination of "debatable" evidence by the trial judge is one way
of attempting to enforce such a new materiality standard. As Justice Stevens
observed in his concurring opinion in Kyes, "our duty to administer justice
occasionally requires busy judges to engage in a detailed review of the particular
facts of a case, even though our labors may not provide posterity with a newly
minted rule of law."5" The Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment recently
recommended that the Supreme Court of Illinois adopt a rule redefining
exculpatory evidence in order to provide guidance to prosecutors in making
appropriate disclosure.59 The Commission defined exculpatory evidence as:
[I]nformation that is material and favorable to the defendant because
it tends to: (1)Cast doubt on defendant's guilt as to any essential
element in any count in the indictment or information; (2) Cast doubt
on the admissibility of evidence that the state anticipates offering in its
case-in-chief that might be subject to a motion to suppress or exclude;
(3) Cast doubt on the credibility or accuracy of any evidence that the
state anticipates offering in its case-in-chief; or (4) Diminish the
degree of the defendant's culpability or mitigate the defendant's
potential sentence. 6
This definition of exculpatory evidence is broader than Brady in that it
requires "uncertain" evidence to be disclosed to the defendant.6 This definition
56.
Id.
57.
Bagley,473 U.S. at 675 (stating that the prosecution is not required to deliver its entire file
to the defense but must only disclose favorable evidence that if suppressed would result in an unfair

trial).
58.
59.
60.
61.

Kyes, 514 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring).
ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,

Id.
Id.

supra note 34, at 119.
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will arguably require that evidence, which appears trivial, must be disclosed to the
defendant and therefore create an undue burden on the prosecution to scour its
62
entire file for any and all evidence seemingly favorable to the defendant.
However, what may appear a trivial piece of evidence to the prosecution may in
fact be material to the defense strategy.63 As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent
in BagIey, "[E]xistence of any small piece of evidence favorable to the defense
may, in a particular case, create just the doubt that prevents the jury from
Moreover, any failure by the prosecution to
returning a verdict of guilty."'
disclose what it considers trivial or cumulative evidence would also fall under the
harmless error rule because truly minor or cumulative evidence would not
warrant relief in any event.6" Defining exculpatory evidence to include all
evidence favorable to the defense would be consistent with the idea that
disclosure of all favorable evidence would:
[B] egin to assure that a possibly dispositive piece of information is not
withheld from the trier of fact by a prosecutor who is torn between
the two roles he must play. A clear rule of this kind, coupled with a
presumption in favor of disclosure, also would . .. remov[e] a
substantial amount of unguided [prosecutorial] discretion.66
In effect, the Bagley materiality standard requires prosecutors to examine
evidence with a flashlight when a spotlight is required.67 The Bagley standard
encourages limiting Bradys reach to evidence which directly indicates whether the
defendant is innocent or guilty.68 For example, inconsistent statements by a
witness as to the initial identity of the perpetrator of a crime can be chalked up
to the nervousness of the witness, and such information may be deemed
immaterial to the defendant's guilt or innocence.69 This results in evidence being

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 (noting that the prosecution does not have to turn over its entire
62.
file to the defense).
Id.
at 693 (MarshallJ., dissenting).
63.

64.

Id

Id at 678 (noting that suppression of favorable evidence only rises to a constitutional
65.
violation if it deprives the defendant of the right to a fair trial).
66.
Id at 698 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67.
See Morales v. Portuondo, 154 F. Supp. 2d 706, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing People v.
Thomas, 500 N.E.2d 293, 295 (N.Y. 1986)) ("[S]tatements offered by a defendant as exculpatory
evidence are held to a more lenient standard of scrutiny than those offered by the prosecution as
inculpatory evidence.").
68.
See Bagly, 473 U.S. at 682 ("The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." (emphasis added)).
69.
But see Waller v. Commonwealth, 467 S.E.2d 844, 847 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Hall v.
Commonwealth, 355 S.E.2d 591,594 (Va. 1987)) ("It is fundamental to the right of cross-examination that a witness who is not a party to the case on trial may be impeached by prior statements
").
made by the witness which are inconsistent with his present testimony ....
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overlooked because it does not directly negate guilt.7" Furthermore, Brady and
Bagley impinge upon the fairness of the trial because they allow prosecutors to
examine the evidence as if their decision were being reviewed post-trial at the
appellate level."' This circular process means the prosecution gets to determine
from a post-trial vantage point what should be considered material to the
defense's case at the pretrial stage. Thus, the prosecution may retain evidence
favorable to the defense if the evidence is simply favorable but not material and
thereby undermine the operation of the adversarial system.7 2 However, as Justice
Marshall noted in his Bagley dissent, "[I]t is the job of the defense, not the
prosecution,3 to decide whether and in what way to use arguably favorable
'7
evidence."
One way to ensure a measure of transparency is to require prosecutors to
provide open-file discovery to defendants in cases where death is a possible
punishment.74 As the United States Supreme Court has stressed, the death
penalty is a different type of punishment both in terms of severity and finality.75
"It is of vital importance to the defendant and the community that any decision
to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than
caprice or emotion."76 The Constitution Project's Death Penalty Initiative
submitted eighteen recommended reforms to the death penalty system.77 Section
70. See Burows,438 S.E.2d at 302 (noting that the evidence sought was of impeachment value
in stating the witness's motivation for testifying).
71.
See Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976,979 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that "the prosecutor's
absolute duty to disclose under Brady is limited to evidence a reasonable prosecutor would perceive
at the time as being material and favorable to the defense").
72. See United States v. King, 928 F. Supp. 1059, 1062 (D. Kan. 1996) (citing United States
v. Comosona, 848 F.2d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir. 1988)) ("If a statement does not contain any expressly
exculpatory material, the Government need not produce that statement to the defense."). In Taylor
v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of full disclosure
in criminal trials:
"The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and
comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to
be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of
the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all
the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done,
it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the
production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense."
Tqylor, 484 U.S. at 408-09 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)).
73.
Bagey, 473 U.S. at 698 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
74. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, MANDATORYJUSTICE: EIGHTEEN REFORMS TO THE
DEATH PENALTY at 47-50 (2001).
75.
See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (holding that the defendant was
denied due process of law when his death conviction was imposed).
76.
Id. at 358.
77.
THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 74, at ix. The commission was organized by
the Constitution Project and its members comprised of supporters and opponents of the death
penalty. Id. These members included former judges, prosecutors, victim advocates, defense
lawyers, journalists, and scholars and others concerned with the death penalty. Id
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Eight, which governs the role of prosecutors, recommends that "because of the
paramount interest in avoiding the execution of an innocent person, special
discovery provisions should be established to govern death penalty cases. These
provisions should provide for discovery from the prosecution that is as full and
complete as possible, consistent with the requirements of public safety.""8 The
committee expanded on its recommendation by stating that "full open-file"
discovery should be required in capital cases.79 On the other hand, open-file
discovery of the prosecutor's files means nothing if the relevant information is
For example, relevant information has
not contained in those files."'
languished in the files of law enforcement departments for years until ultimately
discovered."' In order to curtail suppression of this type, especially in capital
cases, the prosecution must ensure that all information has been requested from
all its agencies, and the defense must remind the prosecution to do so. 2 In fact,
recommendation 48 by the Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment noted
that:
[W]hile the prior [Illinois] Supreme Court rules required the
Srosecution to ensure that flow of information was maintained
etween the various investigatory personnel and the prosecution so
that information could be evaluated for disclosure to the defense, [a]
new rule... goes one step further and will likely encourage increased
vigilance by the prosecution to insure that all investigatory materials
have been obtained. 3
The Commission went on to recommend that a certificate be filed by the State
and indicate that conferences had been held with all those connected to the case
and all material required to be disclosed had been disclosed.'
Undoubtedly, suppression of evidence will continue to plague the justice
system if prosecutors remain the sole judges of what constitutes exculpatory
material evidence." Advances in science have exonerated many defendants and
brought to light instances of illegally suppressed evidence.8 6 The practice of
78.
79.

Id at 47.
Id

80.
Id
81.
See Taus v. Senkowski, 293 F. Supp. 2d 238, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that an
exculpatory FBI report was not turned over to the prosecution until almost ten years after trial).
82.
ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 34, at 119.
83.
Id
84.
Id at 118.
85.
See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545,559 (1977) (stating that although the perspective
of an advocate is helpful to the defendant in ferreting out information, settled practice has been that
the prosecution determines what is material information and its decision on what to disclose is often
final).
86.
Seegeneraly BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW, INNOCENCE PROJECT at http://
www.innocenceproject.org/case/display-cases.php?sort=year -exoneration (last visited September
21,2004).
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allowing prosecutors to be the sole judges of exculpatory evidence, therefore,
warrants closer examination." If prosecutors remain the sole judges of what
evidence is exculpatory, they will be the judges, effectively, of defendants' guilt
or innocence.8
Prosecutors may argue that Brady violations are rare, and while the system
is imperfect, Brady is actually working quite efficiently. 9 However, even rare
violations of Brady, especially in capital cases, are unacceptable. A series of
articles bythe Chicago Tribune examined over 380 cases nationwide, including
capital cases, where Bradyviolations occurred.90 The articles presented instances
of wilful Brady violations in which prosecutors concealed evidence that
discredited key prosecution witnesses, pointed to other suspects, or supported
defendants' claims of self-defense.91 Such violations of Brady, while perhaps
"rare," adversely impact the lives of defendants and cumulatively impair the
functioning of the judicial system. The rarity of Brady violations does not take
away the adverse impact they have on the system as a whole because
"[p]rosecutors, who are the criminal justice system's gatekeepers, hold powers
and responsibilities unique in American society."92
The Professional Rules of Conduct of each state may impose sanctions
upon a prosecutor for a Brady violation, but, in and of itself, a violation of Brady
imposes no other liability.93 In fact, in many cases, the only sanction a
prosecutor receives is in the form of a critical judicial opinion concerning
prosecutorial misconduct.94 The remedy a defendant usually obtains is a new
trial and admission of the suppressed evidence." When a prosecutor fails to
disclose exculpatory evidence, the result is a trial that is skewed in favor of the
prosecution. Additionally, the fact that the United States Supreme Court has
87. See State v. Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 133 (i. 2003) (stating that the trial judge is in the best
position, in the exercise of his or her sound discretion, to determine the optimal time for evaluating
the relative significance of proffered exculpatory but otherwise privileged material).
88. S&,gwnrayBursey, 429 U.S. at 545.
t
89. See, eg., Steve Weinberg,A Qztonqc
nV PwiaosDisptetheSzigr0aqf
ot-a
nkr1Misa=d4' 7 at http://www.pubhlicintegrity.org/pm/printer-fiendly.aspxaid=34 (June 26,
2003) (noting that in manycases allegations of misconduct are rarely substantiated and are confused
with prosecutorial error).
90. Possley& Armstrong, sup note 51, at 7.
91.
Id
92. Id at 12.
93. S&wlmbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 409 (1976) (holding that prosecutors acting within

the scope of their duties have absolute immunity from civil liability.

94.
See Banks, 124 S. C. at 1273 (criticizing the State's failure to turn over exculpatory
evidence to the defense).
95.
SeeMiller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1,7 (1967) (granting habeas relief when prosecution misrepresented paint stained shorts as blood stained and failed to disclose true nature of stains); Ex parte
Richardson, 70 S.W.3d 865, 873 (Tex. G'im. App. 2002) (reversing a capital murder conviction).
96.
SwA gws, 427 U.S. at 104 (noting that failure to disclose exculpatory evidence "involves
a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process").
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granted prosecutors absolute immunity from civil liability for Brady violations
demonstrates one possible reason why wilful abuse of the doctrine continues
today.97
To ensure compliance with Brady, meaningful sanctions should be imposed
on the prosecution for wilful violations.9 The rationale for such sanctions was
99
extensively discussed by Justice W(hite in his concurrence in Imbler v. Pacbtman.
Justice White disagreed with the implication that "absolute immunity for
prosecutors extends to suits based on claims of unconstitutional suppression of
evidence because I believe such a rule would threaten to injure the juridical
The Imbler majority
process and to interfere with Congress' purpose."'"
concluded that granting prosecutors absolute immunity to civil liability was
proper because the "ultimate fairness of the operation of the system ...

could

be weakened by subjecting prosecutors to [civil] liability."''1 1 However, the
concurrence noted that the adverse consequences of imposing civil liability for
Brady violations mentioned by the Imbler majority were already "present with
respect to suit against policemen, school teachers, and other executives, and have
never before been thought sufficient to immunize an official absolutely no
matter how outrageous his conduct.' 0 2 In fact, a prosecutor who wants to
protect against liability for wrongful failure to disclose evidence may choose to
disclose more than is necessary.0 3 This type of disclosure will only help, not
harm, the judicial process."
Imposing such liability will arguably discourage dedicated prosecutors from
remaining in public service."1 But even under a more aggressive use of sanctions
for Brady violations, good-faith violations of Brady would continue to enjoy
immunity.10 6 Prosecutors who have dedicated their careers to public service
should benefit from stricter sanctions imposed for wilful violations of Brady
because such changes will weed out those willing to win at all costs while
preserving the integrity of the judicial system.
97. See Imbler,424 U.S. at 420 (stating that prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from §1983
suits relating to acts performed within the scope of their duties).
98. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (noting that "it has been thought
in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those
who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation").
99. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 441-45 (White, J., concurring).
100. Id.at 433.
Id.
at 427.
101.
102. Id at 436 (White, J., concurring).
103.

Id.at 443.

104.
105.

Id.
See Imbler,424 U.S. at 424-25 (noting that to allow civil liability would open a path for

unlimited harassment and embarrassment to prosecutors by those who would profit).
Id at 437-38 (White, J., concurring) (noting that there should not be a rule granting
106.
absolute immunity from suits for committing wiqul violations of pre-existing constitutional

disclosure requirements if done in bad faith).
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III. Witness PreparationMust be MemorializedforBrady Purposes
Delma Banks was arrested, charged, and convicted of killing sixteen-yearold Richard Whitehead." 7 During the guilt phase of the trial, Charles Cook
10 8
testified for the prosecution that Banks had confessed to killing the victim.
The prosecution suppressed a seventy-three page transcript of a pretrial meeting
between the prosecutor, law enforcement officers, and Cook."° On crossexamination, Cook represented three times that he had not discussed his
testimony with anyone.'
The prosecution allowed Cook's statement to stand
uncorrected and in fact told the jury that Cook had given them "[tihe absolute
truth.""' Subsequently, it was discovered that Cook had at least three practice
sessions with the prosecution and was "intensively coached" for his appearance
at trial. 1 2 The pretrial transcript showed that Cook had been unable to keep his
account of the story straight."' The transcript also revealed that the prosecutor
repeatedly coached Cook." 4 But when Cook stated in open court before the jury
that his testimony had not been coached, the prosecution failed to correct that
assertion.115 Thus, the prosecution clearly presented false testimony concerning
the circumstances surrounding Cook's pretrial preparation." 6 Banks may prove
to have a significant impact by implicitly expanding Brady to requirng disdosure
of pretrial preparation sessions between prosecutors and their witnesses." 7 It
further raises the question of 8whether these sessions should now be
memorialized for Bray purposes."
Generally, attorneys prepare their witnesses for trial to relay a particular
story to the jury in the most sympathetic and clear manner." 9 But while
107.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1263.
108.
Id.at 1264.
109.
Id.at 1269.
110.
Id.at 1264.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
George Kendall, ProsecutorialMiscondctandIneffective Counsel The Case Of DelmaBanks,jr.,
5, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=38&did=588 (August 5, 2004).
114.
Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1264.
115.
Id.
116.
Id.at 1280 n. 19. The Supreme Court noted that Banks's defense attorney demonstrated
Cook had been coached by calling "attention to discrepancies between portions of the September
1980 transcripts and Cooks trial testimony." Id The defense attorney also "emphasized the
prosecution's duty to disclose the September 1980 transcript once Cook, while on the stand, stated
that he had not been coached." Id.
117.
Id.at 1264.
118.
Id.at 1263.
119.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.4(b) (stating that a lawyer shall not
"counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely"). While a lawyer has the right to prepare his client for
trial, he must not cross the ethical barrier by knowingly allowing his client to commit perjury. Id
The adversary system requires that the attorney present his cases as clearly and concisely as possible,
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preparing a witness is good lawyening, the fact that a prosecutor has prodded a
witness to revise the substance of his testimony arguably falls in the category of
Brady material because the witness's original, uncoached version qualifies as a
prior inconsistent statement.'2 0 In both civil and criminal cases, pretrial
preparation of witnesses is an essential part of ensuring that a witness conveys
1 21
his testimony to the jury or trier of fact in a clear and concise manner.
"Similarly, the ethical lawyer defending a client . . . tries to make proper
objections, assert privilege and protect the witness from abuse, all without
manipulating the testimony."122 But, if a prosecutor coaches a witness and fails
to reveal exculpatory evidence to the defense which may impeach that witness,
that attorney has committed a breach of his ethical and legal duties to the
123

court.

Under the facts of Banks, moreover, if a witness professes he was not
coached in his testimony, the prosecution must clearly acknowledge the truth of
the matter and turn over any transcripts or notes of rehearsal sessions showing
that the witness was in fact coached. 24 But Banks arguably applies equally if the
witness states that he has been prepped by the prosecution. For example, to the
extent a witness testifies and his trial testimony is inconsistent with his pretrial
statements, the prosecutor has an obligation to disclose the substance of such
statements whether or not any record of them exists. Since the prosecutor is
responsible for knowing the content of his witness's statements, if there exists
no record of the prior statement, the prosecution should be required to submit
the prior inconsistent statement in memo form to the court and
the content of
125
defense.
the

however, he may not use false and tailored testimony. Id
See infra Part III and accompanying notes (discussing disclosure of prior inconsistent
120.
statements and memorialization of prosecution-witness rehearsal sessions).
See Alec Rothrock, TrialTalk.'Coaching the Witness 3, at http://www.burnsfigawill.com/
121.
articles/ Rothrock/trialtalk/trialtalkcoachingthewitness.htm#TopoPageCoachingthewitness
(February/March 2000) ("[Wjitness preparation is permitted, expected, required, important, and
beneficial. The ethical lawyer tries to prepare a witness without influencing the substance of the
witness's testimony.").
Id.;seeBanks,124 S. Ct. at 1268 (notingthatthe transcripts revealed thatCook's testimony
122.
was rehearsed after Banks's September 1980 arrest, that the testimony was "closely rehearsed" by
State representatives, and that this presented compelling evidence that Cook's testimony was
tutored by the prosecution).
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.4(b) (providing that a lawyer may not
123.
"falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness
that is prohibited by law").
124.
See Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1263 (noting that the witness had been coached); United States
v. Beasley, 576 F.2d 626, 632-33 (5th Cir. 1978) (criticizing the failure of the Government to
produce in a timely manner the statement of a prosecution witness when the statement's content
was different from the witness's at trial testimony).
See generaly Rothrock, supra note 121.
125.
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This aspect of Banks strengthens the argument that if contact between the
prosecution or its agents and witnesses or victims results in material exculpatory
evidence, such evidence must be memorialized."-6 Without memorialization of
witness preparation sessions, the defense will be unable to impeach witnesses
with exculpatory evidence solely within the prosecution's knowledge and
possession. 27 This argument finds support in Kyles, in which the prosecution's
case rested heavily on eyewitness testimony. 2 One such witness, Isaac
Smallwood, was deemed questionable by the Court.' The prosecutor's notes
showed that "important elements" of Smallwood's story had changed over
time. 3 ° However, despite the various inconsistencies and variations in the
witness's story, neither the prosecutor's notes nor any of the other notes and
transcripts were given to the defense.' 3' The Court noted that the inconsistencies in Smallwood's testimony between the first and second trial "would have
fueled a withering cross-examination, destroying confidence in Smallwood's
story and raising a substantial implication that the prosecutor had coached him
to give it."' 3 2 The Court observed that "[t]he implication of coaching would have
been complemented by the fact that Smallwood's testimony at the second trial
was much more precise and incriminating than his testimony at the first."' 33
Together, Kyles and Banks present a compelling argument for the
memorialization of witness rehearsal sessions. Both cases show that during
witness preparation sessions, a line must be drawn between attorney workproduct and information subject to Brady."z When the prosecutor interviews the
witness and records his own mental impressions, that is undoubtedly workproduct. 3 ' However, the witness's storytelling in response to the interview is
information subject to Brady. The focus on witness preparation in Banks and the
discussion of the key witnesses's inconsistent statements in Kyles lead to the
126.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1275. The Court, while discussing Strickler, mentioned that in light
of the State's open file policy it was" 'especially unlikely that defense counsel would have suspected
that additional impeaching evidence was being withheld.' " Id at 1274-75 (quoting Strickler, 527
U.S. at 285). The defense does not have to "scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady material when
the prosecution represents that all such evidence has been disclosed." Id.
at 1275. The Court noted
that a rule declaring that a" 'prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,' is not tenable in a system
constitutionaUy bound to accord defendant's due process." Id
127.
Id
128.
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 429.
129.
Idat 443.
130.
Id at 429.
131.
Id
132.
Idat 443.
133.
Id at 443 n.14.
134. See Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1264 (recounting the fact that witness Cook had been coached
by the prosecution); Kyes, 514 U.S. at 443-44 (noting the impeachment potential of discrepancies
between witness's statements at various phases of trial preparation).
135.
See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947) (stating that an attorney's mental
impressions are protected from discovery).
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conclusion that prosecutors should memorialize their interviews with
witnesses."' The risk that exculpatory material will be left on the cutting room
floor is especially great during witness preparation.137 In Banks, the Court noted
testimony had been
that the long-suppressed transcripts revealed that Cook's
38
extensively rehearsed and shaped by the prosecution.
While prosecutors may argue that requiring memorialization of witness
interviews will create an undue burden and will conflict with their roles as
adversaries, in fact, the criminal justice system as a whole will benefit from
memorialization of witness meetings.'39 As the Court stated in Baglqy, the
prosecutors's role "transcends that of an adversary: [the prosecutor] 'is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty...
whose interest... in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done.' ""4 Therefore, while the prosecution will initially bear
some additional burden, the most important aspect of any criminal case should
be to see justice is done.' At the very least, Banks and Kyles, when read together,
establish that transcripts, notes, and unrecorded recollections of witnessif the sessions indude
preparation sessions will be deemed Brady material
14 2
information that is material to guilt or mitigation.
When jurors observe a witness in court, they are frequently witnessing the
final product of numerous meetings between prosecutors and witnesses, and the
jury has no way of knowing that the testimony of the witness has been finetuned. 1 43 In Kyles, the Court observed that the "jury would reasonably have been
troubled by the adjustments to Smallwood's original story by the time of the
second trial."' Furthermore, if as in Banks, the defense attorney questions a
coached witness as to whether or not his testimony has been coached and the
witness answers in the negative, both the defense and the jury will have to accept
the response of the witness unless the prosecution corrects the assertion. 45 A
136.
See Orndorff v. Lockhart, 707 F. Supp. 1062, 1068 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (finding that the
prosecutor failed to disclose that the witness's memory was hypnotically refreshed during pretrial
investigation).
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1263.
137.
138.
Id at 1268.
See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 (stating that the purpose of the Brady rule was "to ensure that
139.
a miscarriage of justice did not occur").
140.
Id. at 675 n.6 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).

141.

Id.

Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1264; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 429-30.
142.
143.
See Rothrock, supra note 121, at 2 (emphasizing the difficulty of detecting influenced
witness testimony).
144.
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 443.
145.
See FED. R.EvID. 611 (b) ("Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of
the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness."). Without the impeaching evidence showing inconsistent statements or coaching, the defense attorney will have to accept
the witness's false and prejudicial response. Id.
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memorialized copy of rehearsal sessions between the prosecution and the
witness provides the defense with the tools for an effective cross-examination
and informs the jury of potentially impeaching evidence concerning how
coaching may have changed the witness's testimony.'46
Banks also raises the question of the relationship between the attorney
work-product doctrine and Brady. The work-product doctrine was firmly
established in Hickman v. Taylor."47
' In Hickman, the Court decided whether and
to what extent a party to an action could inquire into the oral and written
statements of witnesses or other information that counsel had gathered in
preparation for possible litigation."4 The Court noted that in performing his
duties, a lawyer must be able to perform his work with a degree of privacy and
freedom from intrusion by opposing counsel into his statements, interviews,
mental impressions, and person beliefs.'49 To protect this right, the Court held
that:

[WIithout purported necessity or justification, to secure written
statements, private memoranda and personal recollections prepared or
formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties
...falls outside the arena of discovery and contravenes the public
policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims.
Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify
unwarranted
inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an
50
attorney.'
The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether Brady requires the
prosecution to turn over work-product.'
It is arguable that transcripts and
notes of a prosecutor constitute work-product and thus are not discoverable
under Brady.12 However, while opinion work-product is privileged absent
extraordinary circumstances, the underlying facts and non-privileged information
obtained or prepared by the prosecution during preparation of its case for trial
are not necessarily immune from discovery. 153 The facts of Banks serve as an
example of when Brady must reach the work-product of prosecutors." 4 Unlike
146.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (requiring that the defendant be afforded a reasonable
opportunity for effective cross-examination of the witnesses against him); Murdoch, 365 F.3d at 704
("Effective cross-examination is of paramount importance when... the government's case depends
heavily (or entirely) upon the testimony of informants or accomplices.").
147.
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
148.
Id.at 497.
149.
Id. at 511.
150.
Id at 510.
151.
SeeWilliamson v. Moore, 221 F.3d 1177,1182(11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Mincey v. Head,
206 F.3d 1106, 1133 n.63 (11th Cir. 2000)) (" 'Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has
decided whether Brady requires a prosecutor to turn over his work product.' ").
152.
Id.
153.
Id.; Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
154.
Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1263-64.
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cases in which the prosecution would be turning over non-verbatim and nonadopted witness statements, the prosecution in Banks had in its possession a
verbatim transcript of the rehearsal session with Cook. 5' The Eleventh Circuit
has noted that "for prejudice to exist, we must find that the evidence- although
56
itself inadmissible- would have led the defense to some admissible evidence."
It is unquestionable that the record of the prosecutorial rehearsal session with
Cook in Barks could foreseeably have led to the discovery of admissible
As noted earlier in this section, the information
impeachment evidence.'
flowing from a witness to the prosecutor during a rehearsal session is properly
subject to Brady.' The witness relays unprivileged facts about what he knows
or observed concerning a crime, and his statements are not work-product of the
prosecutor.19 If a witness testifies consistentlythroughout all sessions with the
prosecutor and at trial as to the content of his statements, then there is no Brady
obligation. However, if as in K)* and Banks, the witness testifies inconsistently
between the pretrial preparations and trial, or his testimony becomes more
precise and incriminating as the proceedings progress, such information is
undoubtedly subject to Brady.
ializa ForPutsesjBrady
gPffets Sbtud BeM
IV. PlaeBa
1
In Spikrv Racxbury CbclIntizute,' LarryBrown had been arrested on
three counts of distribution of cocaine and stated to his counsel that he had
information about an unrelated assault at a restaurant named Armadillos for
which defendant Spicer stood accused.' 6 ' Brown specificallycommunicated to
his own counsel that he had not seen the defendant on the date of the crime. 62
His counsel contacted the prosecutor and informed him that Brown could testify
to knowing a man named "Spicy" who had asked questions about Armadillo's,
that he suspected "Spicy" may have been planning a robbery, but he had not
observed Spicer on the date of the crime. 163 When the prosecutor interviewed
Brown without his own counsel present, however, Brown stated for the first
time stated that he had actually observed Spicer running from the scene of the
155. Id at 1263; seealso Wdlinorm 221 F.3d at 1183 (noting that non-verbatim, non-adopted
witness statements were not admissible at trialdue to the riskof inaccuracyand untmstworthiness).
Widllinm,
221 F.3d at 1183 (citing Bradleyv. Nagle, 212 F.3d 559,567 (1th Cir. 2000)).
156.
157. See Bans, 124 S. C. at 1263-64 (describing the State's intensive coaching of witness
Cook and indicating that it may have discredited Cook if disclosed).

158.

Hkkdmvn 329 U.S. at 511.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id
194 F.3d 547 (4th Car.1999).
Spicer, 194 F.3d at 551.
Id
Id
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crime." While recognizing the inconsistency between what Brown's counsel
originally told him and Brown's subsequent testimony, the prosecutor relied on
what Brown told him directly rather than the original proffered information. 6 '
Brown testified at trial that he had seen the defendant "run past" from the
scene of the crime.' 66 He also testified that this was the same account of the
events he had told his own counsel prior to the plea bargain agreement. 67 After
the defendant was found guilty, Brown's defense counsel learned of the
discrepancies between Brown's original proffer and his eventual testimony and
contacted Spicer's attorney. 16 On federal habeas review, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Brown's statements to his counsel
that he had not seen the defendant on the day of the crime qualified as Brady
material. 1 69 The court noted that the fact that Brown told two different versions
of his story demonstrated that the information, "if disclosed to the defense,
could have been used to impeach Brown."'o7 The court noted that "the
impeaching nature of [a] statement does not depend on whether the state was a
direct or indirect audience. For purposes of determining whether evidence is
'favorable' to the defendant, it is the content of the statements, not their mode
of communication to the state, that is important.' 7' Therefore, regardless of the
must be disclosed
manner in which the proffers were initiated or obtained, they 72
by the prosecution when they contain exculpatory evidence.'
The Spicer court clarified that although it was applying Brady to a defense
proffer, it did not hold the prosecution liable for exculpatory material that
flowed only between a witness and his attorney.' 7' Nor are prosecutors required
to disclose potentially exculpatory material from the hypothesizing that typically
occurs during plea negotiations.' 74 However, a prosecutor is responsible for
information he or she receives, which an objectively reasonable prosecutor
should recognize as exculpatory or of impeachment value, and has a duty to
disclose such information to the defendant if it is material.175 Consequently,
when a prosecutor possesses specific factual information obtained during a plea
bargain discussion with an attorney and additional information from the witness
is directly inconsistent with his prior statements, a reasonable and prudent
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id
Id
Id at 552.
Spicer, 194 F.3d at 552.
Id at 553.
Id at 556.
Id at 557.
Id at 556.
Id at 557-58.
Spicer, 194 F.3d at 557-58.
Id
Id
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prosecutor should be alert for possible exculpatory Brady material and immediately disclose such information to the defense.176
While plea negotiations are usually informal during the preliminary phases,
both prosecutors and defense attorneys should be alert to potential Brady
material.'77 As noted by the dissent in Spicer,"[Plroffers by counsel attempting
to negotiate a plea ...are, by their very nature, unreliable for ascertaining specific
facts."' 78 Nevertheless, Spicer indicates that defense proffers are not wholly
immune from Brady disclosure.' 79 The process of negotiating deals between a
defendant and the prosecution may be a lengthy process.'" ° What the witness
ultimately testifies to and what was proffered initially will likely differ.' 8'
Moreover, as in Spicer,a witness or informant may state that he has information
about the crime when in fact he has little or no knowledge. 8 2 Plea bargains can
actually exacerbate this problem because deals are often contingent on the
witness's favorable testimony in court.'83 Any previous deals between a prosecutorial agent and an informant must be discoverable and admissible to show
potential bias in their testimony.' 84
The defense will not be able to discern the motives a witness has in agreeing
to testify in a case unless the prosecution reveals the information about the
negotiation leading up to the agreement. 85 The importance of the inconsistent
statements in Spicer is a compelling example of why proffers must be
176.

Id at 558-60.

177.
Id Spicer indicates the importance of ensuring that reliable information is transmitted
between the defense and the prosecutor during plea negotiations. Id
178.
Id.at 565 (King, J.,
dissenting).
179.
Spicer, 194 F.3d at 556.
180.
Id.at 547.
181.
See United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1202 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (citing United
States v. Van Brandy, 726 F.2d 548, 552 (9th Cir. 1984)) (stating that if the differences between the
testimony of a witness and his proffers were reasonably "innocuous," but the usefulness of the
evidence was doubtful, the doubt should be resolved in favor of disclosure).
182.
Spicer, 194 F.3d at 551.
183.
See BagIey, 473 U.S. at 683 (stating that the fact that the deal "was expressly contingent on
the Government's satisfaction with the end result, served only to strengthen any incentive to testify
falsely in order to secure a conviction"); Ouimette v. Moran, 942 F.2d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1991)
(noting the State's failure to disclose information about the long criminal record of the State's
witness and the existence of a deal the State struck with the witness);Jones v. Jago, 575 F.2d 1164,
1167 (6th Cir. 1978) (noting that the prosecutor failed to disclose a statement from the co-indictee,
who prior to trial had been declared a material witness for the prosecution and against whom all
charges were dropped).
184.
See Reutter v. Solem, 888 F.2d 578, 581-82 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the State
withheld impeachment evidence that its primary witness had applied for commutation and had been
scheduled to appear before the parole board a few days after his testimony).
185.
See Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1203 C'[llnformation that reveals the process by which a
...witness and the government reach a leniency agreement is relevant to the witness's credibility
because it reveals the witness's motive to testify against the defendant. Therefore, such information
is discoverable under Brady and Gig/io').
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memorialized.' 86 Without memorialization, the results may be similar to Banks
and Kyles, and material impeachment evidence will remain undisclosed.'87
V. Victim-Witness Advocate Files and Brady
Prosecutors' offices and police departments around the country increasingly
utilize victim-witness advocates.' 88 A victim-witness advocate primarily acts as
liaison between the victim or witness and the prosecution and law
enforcement.' 89 The victim-witness advocate facilitates her clients' involvement
with the criminal justice system and may frequently become a counselor to a
victim or witness, and thus, is privy to information that defense counsel is unable
to obtain. 9 ° Because advocates are usually employees of the prosecution, their
work should be subject to the same rules of the discovery process as the work
from the rest of the prosecution's team.'
When an advocate interviews a witness or victim, such meetings, as with
prosecutorial witness preparation sessions, should be memorialized for Brady
purposes. 9 2 The defense will not be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine,
as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, if victim or witness statements are not
memorialized."' In many cases, the prosecution's case hinges on the testimony
of the victim or witness.' 94 The credibility of such witnesses often makes the
difference between a guilty or not guilty verdict."' In fact, in Murphy v. Superior
186. Spier, 194 F.3d at 551.
187. See Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1263 (noting that the prosecution continued to hold secret the key
witness's link to the police and false statements); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 429 (noting that the prosecutor
failed to turn over notes or other transcripts with various witness inconsistencies).
188.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-11.01 (Michie 2004) (setting out crime victim and witness
rights and stating that "[ujnless otherwise stated ...it shall be the responsibility of a locality's crime
victim and witness assistance program to provide information and assistance required").
VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY, VICTIM-WITNESS PROGRAM, at http://
189.
www.vcu.edu/police/victwitn.html (last updated August 15, 2003) (setting forth the victim or
witness rights and entitlements, which include protection, financial assistance, social services,
confidentiality information, and the right to remain in the courtroom during criminal proceedings).
SeeJaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (establishing that the relationship between
190.
a therapist and her client is confidential). If a victim-witness advocate is also a certified social
worker, clinical social worker or psychologist, then the privileges allowed in Jaffe will attach to
communications between the victim or witness and the advocate. Id These privileges arc in
addition to the work-product privilege imputed by virtue of being an agent of the prosecution. Id
191.
See Murphy v. Superior Court, 689 P.2d 532, 537 (Ariz. 1984) (stating that victim
assistance caseworkers may be potential impeachment witnesses). But see State v. Wilcox, 758 A.2d
824, 832-36 (Conn. 2000) (stating that no violation of Brady existed for failure to turn over
impeaching but non-material victim-witness advocate notes).
See supra Part III (discussing the need for memorialization of prosecution-witness
192.
rehearsal sessions).
Id
193.
SeeDubose v. Lefevre, 619 F.2d 973,977 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that the prosecution had
194.
discussed with the witness the consideration she would receive for her proposed testimony).
195.

Id
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Court,196 the court noted that it was "entirely possible that a victim assistance
caseworker, who is frequently in close contact with a distraught victim only
moments after an incident, will learn details of the incident which would make
the caseworker a proper subject for discovery as a potential impeachment
witness. ' 19' The defendant in Murphy attempted to compel the depositions of
the victim and her victim-witness assistant after his indictment for attempted
sexual assault.198 In such cases, in which the advocate has exculpatory evidence,
if the advocate's notes are not subject to the same rules of discovery as the
prosecutor's notes, the prosecution may be able to circumvent its discovery
obligations. 199 Therefore, for victim-witness advocate programs that are
controlled by the prosecution, the courts should require disclosure of advocates
notes when they contain material information.
In Commonwealth v. IUang," the defendant sought discovery of the notes of
a victim-witness advocate who had spoken with the complaining witness. "° The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the notes of a victim-witness
advocate are protected by the same rules that are applicable to a prosecutor's
notes.20 2 The court also found that "advocates themselves have a duty to relay
to the prosecutor any information they believe is exculpatory., 20 3 The Liang
decision reinforced UnitedStates v. Agurs,2 °4 which held that the prosecution has
a duty to disclose exculpatory material within its possession or control, even
without a request from the defendant. 215 "Prosecutors are subject to a duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence that advocates obtain from conversations with
victims or witnesses, as advocates are agents of the prosecution."' 20 6 I'ang
comports with the holding in Kyles that the prosecution is charged with

196.

689 P.2d 532 (Ariz. 1984).

197.

Mup by, 689 P.2d at 537.

198.

Id at 532.

199.
See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957) (stating that with respect to disclosure, the problem is "one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of
information against the individual's right to prepare his defense").
200.
747 N.E.2d 112 (Mass. 2001).
201.
Commonwealth v. Liang, 747 N.E.2d 112, 114 (Mass. 2001).
202.
Id. The Lang court noted that:

The result here secures the defendant's right to obtain essential material for his defense
(e.g., exculpatory evidence and witness statements) while protecting the work product
of attorneys and their legal staff. We conclude that, unless advocates' notes contain
exculpatory evidence or 'statements" of witnesses, their notes are protected as work
product.

Id at 119.
203. Id at 117.
204. 427 U.S. 96 (1976).
205.

Id at 116; UnitedStates v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 96, 106-08 (1976).

206.

Liang,747 N.E.2d at 117.

CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

20 7
knowledge of information contained in the files of those under its control.
The Massachusetts decision forces the prosecution to closely examine its
advocates' files in order to determine whether they contain exculpatory
evidence." 8 It also means that the prosecution must diligently ensure that all
material, exculpatory evidence is turned over to it from third parties within its
control.2°
To be sure, there is a conflict between the victim-witness advocate's role as
an employee of the .prosecution and its role as a counselor to victims and
witnesses. Due to this conflict, prosecutors should choose between maintaining
the advocate as a subordinate program within their control or allowing it to
become a separate and independent entity. 210 In most instances, the advocate
acts as a liaison between the victim or witness and the prosecutors. 21I However,
a special problem arises when licensed social workers, clinical psychologists, or
therapists work as victim-witness advocates and the advocates are also agents of
the prosecution.212 Their conversations with victims or witnesses may fall under
21 3
the category of privileged communications protected from forced disclosure.
These privileged communications include: psychologist-patient privilege, psychiatrist-patient privilege, social worker-client privilege, licensed professional
counselor-client privilege, and domestic violence and sexual assault counselorclient privilege. 214 If the victim-witness advocate program is a separate entity
from the prosecution, a statutory privilege may apply; but there will be no
colorable claim from the prosecution that the work-product privilege applies. 1 5
The idea that communications between victim-witness advocates and

207.
Id at 116; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438.
Liang, 747 N.E.2d. at 116-17.
208.
209.
Id.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-11.01 (Michie 2004) (establishing victim-witness rights and
210.
authorizing victim-witness programs); see also DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES,
VICTIMS OF CRIME IN VIRGINIA at http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/research/documents/
crimeincommonwealth/Section-5.pdf (last visited October 2004) (depicting the substantial increase
in victim-witness programs in Virginia over a ten-year period).
See Genesee Co. Soc. Servs. Workers Union v. Genesee Co., 502 N.W.2d 701, 702-03
211.
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing the assignment of social workers as victim-witness assistants to
the prosecution).
212.
L'ang,747 N.E.2d at 114.
213.
See People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 573 (Mich. 1994) (holding that the trial judge
must conduct an in-camera inspection of privileged records "on a showing that the defendant has
a good-faith belief, grounded on some demonstrable fact, that there is a reasonable probability that
the records are likely to contain material information necessary to the defense," and balancing the
need to preserve confidentiality in therapeutic settings with a defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence).
214.
SeeVA. CODEANN § 8.01-399 (Michie Supp. 2004) (protecting communications between
physicians and patients); VA. CODE ANN. 8.01-400.2 (Michie 2000) (shielding communications
between counselors, social workers, and psychologists and their clients).
215.
See liang,747 N.E.2d at 119 (holding that an advocate's notes are subject to the workproduct privilege but exculpatory evidence must be disclosed).
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victims or witnesses can fairly be kept confidential draws support from the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee v. Redmond.?6 In Jaffee, the
survivors of a victim shot and killed by a police officer sought discovery of the
notes of a licensed clinical social worker who was counseling the officer.217 The
Seventh Circuit, reversing the lower court's decision, concluded that Rule 501 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence "compelled recognition of a psychotherapistpatient privilege. '218 Ultimately, the Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that
the confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her
patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled
disclosure. 219 This presents a strong policy reason why the victim-witness
advocate program should be independent from the prosecution. Privileges
preventing disclosure of relevant information are not favored and may often give
way to a strong public interest.220 In jurisdictions that consider the victimwitness advocate programs an arm of the prosecution or law enforcement
agency, the advocate's notes should be subject to the work-product privilege and
not a confidential communication privilege. 2' However, if the prosecution
asserts either privilege "when a statutory privilege interferes with a defendant's
constitutional right to cross-examine, then, upon a sufficient showing by the
defendant, the witness' statutory privilege must, in the interest of the truthseeking process, bow to the defendant's constitutional rights. 222
Trained victim advocates may be social workers and have extensive legal
knowledge, due in part to their close relationship with the prosecution.2 3
However, they are not formally legally trained and may be unaware of the extent
to which Brady covers their conversations with their clients.24 If the advocate
program is within the jurisdiction of the prosecution, the prosecution must
question its advocates about conversations with victims and other witnesses.2 5
The prosecution must also routinely examine the advocate's files to ensure that
what the victim or witness is telling the prosecutor is consistent with his or her
statements to the advocate.2 6

SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 (recognizing a psychotherapist privilege of confidentiality).
216.
217.
Id at 5.
218.
Id at 6.
219.
Id at 18.
220.
See State v. L.J.P., 37 A.2d 532,537 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (holding that the trial
court committed reversible error in precluding psychotherapist's testimony).
221.
See L'ang, 747 N.E.2d at 114 (holding that the notes of a victim-witness advocate are
protected by the same rules that are applicable to a prosecutor's notes).
222.
Peseti, 65 P.3d at 128.
223.
Liang, 747 N.E.2d at 119.
224.
Id
225.
Id at 117-18.
226.
See id (discussing that the prosecution must determine from advocates' notes whether
witness or victim statements are in advocates' files and subject to a discovery order).
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Subjecting victim-witness advocates' notes to Bradywill arguably constrain
victim advocates in the performance of their duties. Victims or witnesses may

be unwilling to fully disclose information if they have reason to believe their
conversations will be turned over to the defendant and their privacy invaded.
The answer to such a concern, however, is that the victim-witness advocate
program should be independent of the prosecution.2 7 If it is, advocates can
perform a truly therapeutic function for victims and witnesses while being able
to assure them that their privacy will be protected. Additionally, the prosecution
will not normally be aware of the information contained in the advocates' files,
and, therefore, information will not be imputed to them.2' In fact, the defense
would bear the heavy burden of proving to the court that the rights of the
defendant to discover the information contained in the victim advocate's files
overrides the statutory privilege afforded by Jaffee and by equivalent state
statutory protections.

I/7. Taking Advantage of the Expansion ofBrady
Defense attorneys should utilize Brady to the fullest extent the criminal
justice system allows. The courts have constricted the materiality element of
Brady but expanded Brady in other ways beneficial to the defense. 229 While the

basic rules concerning Brady material have not changed, courts have expanded
the content of Brady in cases such as Banks, Spicer, and Liang.23 ° The prosecution
must disclose exculpatory information to the defense whether the information
is in the hands of the prosecution or not."I This includes information known
to the police or other prosecutorial agents, whatever their actual knowledge. 32

Defense counsel should always make motions to examine police officers and
investigators working with the prosecution under oath. 233 The defense should
not only focus on the immediate investigators working on the case, but also

227. See supra Part V (arguing that prosecution entities should choose between the victimwitness program being a subordinate or a separate entity for Brady purposes).
228. See Kyles,514 U.S. at 438-40 (imputing the knowledge of agents of the prosecution to the
prosecution).
229. See Sundby, supra note 12, at 645 (noting that in the decades since Brady, the doctrine has
been both expanded and contracted by subsequent Supreme Court decisions).
230. Seegeneraly Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1263 (noting that transcripts of rehearsal meetings are
impeachment evidence); Spicer, 194 F.3d at 556-57 (finding that defense proffers are subject to
Brady); Laiang, 747 N.E.2d at 119 (holding that victim-witness advocates' notes are subject to Brady).
231.
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421.
232. See Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447, 451 (4th Cir. 1976) (citing Barbee v. Warden, 331
F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964)) (stating that failure to disclose information in the hands of the police
is equally harmful to the defendant as failure to disclose information in the hands of the prosecution); Fitzgerald v. Bass, 358 S.E.2d 576, 582 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that a prosecutor's
lack of knowledge of false testimony does not excuse her failure to disclose the truth).
233.
Please contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearing House at 540-458-8557 for a motion
to examine investigators under oath.
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officers who had close contact with victims and witnesses. 23 4 These officers may
be far removed from the inner workings of the case as time goes on, but very
often these officers have made reports or23notes relating to their conversations
with other officers, witnesses, or victims. '
Often, Brady violations originate not with the prosecution's intentional
suppression of material, but rather with the investigators' failure to turn over
information to the prosecuting attorneys.236 In light of Bagey, Kyles, and Strickler,
it would be considered a willful omission on the part of the prosecution if it did
not regularly peruse the investigators' files during the course of the proceedings. 237 The defense, for its part, should urge the prosecution to remind all
its agents of their duty to disclose exculpatory material within their possession.
For example, a Bray letter to the prosecution requesting disclosure of
information favorable to the defendant can specifically request that the
prosecutor disseminate a memorandum to each law enforcement agency
involved in a case and include such language as, "I am asking each person
connected with this investigation to advise me of any evidence or information
not already furnished that could be viewed as insome way 'favorable' to the
defense." The request should be specific as to all notes, documents, and physical
evidence the defense believes to be in the possession of law enforcement.
Motions must be specific and inclusive.238 Often the defense makes general
Brady motions that are summarily denied by the court. 239 To combat this
problem, defense counsel must ensure that their motions include very specific
information as to potentially exculpatory evidence, and the motions must inform
both the judge and the prosecution about all categories of potential exculpatory
234.
Exparte Richardson,70 S.W.3d at 873 (reversing murder conviction because the prosecution failed to disclose the existence of diary kept by a police officer containing information that
could impeach the State's key witness).
235.
Id at 871. Police officer Tonya Goldston testified that she kept the diary to protect
herself and other officers from false accusations by the witness. Id In addition, five other officers
testified at the writ hearing that the witness was not a truthful person. Id
236.
See Kes, 514 U.S. at 437 (noting that the prosecution failed to turn over notes and
transcripts of inconsistent witness statements); Washington v. Buraker, 322 F. Supp. 2d 692,
699-700 (W.D. Va. 2004) (noting that the defendant alleged police failed to disclose the identity of
an eyewitnesses who had failed to identify him earlier to the prosecution); Moreno v. Commonwealth, 392 S.E.2d 836, 840 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that the police failed to turn over a written
informant agreement for remuneration based on the number of drug busts success fully prosecuted).

237. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 294 (following Bagley in establishing the prejudice standard of
review for suppressed exculpatory material); Kles, 514 U.S. at 437 (discussing that the prosecution
has a duty to learn of exculpatory evidence known to others within its control); Bagly, 473 U.S. at
679 (clarifying the standard of review for when exculpatory material is suppressed).
238. See Brown v. Chaney, 469 U.S. 1090, 1090 (1984) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial
ofcertiorari) (stating that ChiefJustice Burger would grant the order to distinguish between specific
and general requests for exculpatory information).
239. Id at 1093 (noting that the district court refused to issue a writ because defense counsel
only made a general request for exculpatory evidence).

CAPITAL DEFENSEJOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

evidence.24 When defense counsel knows or suspects that the prosecution has
exculpatory information in its possession, he must specifically identify the

evidence in his motion and explain its materiality to guilt or punishment.241
"The defense must give the prosecution notice of what is desired, but
notice alone- such as notice that the defense desires every document in the
prosecution's files- is not enough to overcome the prosecutor's interest in
avoiding premature or excessive discovery."242 The defense should never forget
that the materialityelement also relates to the abilityto prepare for trial.243 The
Bagley Court expressed its concern with the suppression of evidence by stating
that the reviewing court may consider directly "any adverse effect that the

prosecutor's failure to respond might have had on the preparation or
presentation of the defendant's case.""

Therefore, each motion must serve the

dual purpose of preservation of issues and discovery.
As most victim-witness advocates are likely to continue as agents and
employees of the prosecution for the foreseeable future, it is important for
defense counsel to seek disclosure of impeachment and exculpatory evidence
uncovered bysuch advocates through their contact with witnesses. The defense

can begin by requesting disclosure of all impeachment evidence within a
witness's formal statement. Second, the defense attorney should request all
written statements, including prior versions of the final formal statement. Third,
the defense should request any notes of oral conversations that occurred prior
to memorialization of formal statements and that contain exculpatory material.
VIL Condwion
K*, Stridkler,Banks, and at the circuit court level, Spker, demonstrate how
the Brady doctrine has evolved to include witness preparation sessions and
defense proffers on behalf of co-operating witnesses or informant-witnesses.245
Victim-witness advocates present a special problem and as such, the defense
must ensure that the prosecution has requested, received, and disclosed all information contained in the advocates' notes that contain material impeachment or
exculpatory information.246

240. Id at 1094-95 (discussing the various distinctions between general and specific requests
for exculpatory material held by various lower courts since Agun was decided).
241. Id at 1095 (describing the type of notice the defense must give the prosecution).
242. Id
243. Bag~q% 473 U.S. at 683.
244. Id
245. S& Banks, 124 S. Ct.at 1263 (discussing the suppression of rehearsal transcripts); K*I5,
514 U.S. at 438 (imputing knowledge to the prosecution for information within the possession of
its agents); Bag/ey, 473 U.S. at 676 (expanding Bracyto impeachment evidence); Agins, 427 U.S. at
107 (expanding the prosecution's dutyto disclose exculpatoryevidence absent a request); Spkrer, 194
F.3d at 556-57 (expanding Brady to include defense proffers).
246. See supra Part V (discussing the victim-witness advocate program and disclosure of
exculpatory material).

